David W Marks KC
Barrister-at-Law

Inns of Court
16th Level 107 North Quay
Brisbane Qld 4000

(07) 3236 5477
dmarks@qldbar.asn.au
www.davidwmarks.com

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TRUST LITIGATION

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1 Scenario[1]

1. The scenario tracks disagreements amongst members of the mythical "Wolfram" family. The scenario focuses on exercises of powers. But the object or beneficiary must first know of the trust, and know of the exercise of a power.
2. In short:
3. Mr and Mrs Wolfram are trustees of a trust established for one of their two children, Cain. Abel has no knowledge of the trust until one day he notices reference to his family's trust in a newspaper report.
4. The story unfolds that this trust was set up by Mr and Mrs Wolfram, naming Abel and Cain as primary beneficiaries, but the *corpus* was originally a compensation amount for a severe personal injury suffered by Cain.
5. The trustees have invested more or less successfully over the years - in direct land for property development (very successfully) and in shares in Dud Investments Pty Ltd (much less successfully).
6. Having learnt of the trust, Abel seeks information.
7. Having learnt of the trustees' chequered history of investment, Abel looks to have the fund restored by the trustees.
8. Abel having received no appointment of income nor capital, he is dissatisfied with past distributions to Cain who appears comfortably kept. (Abel had moved overseas, and has his own family.)

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[1] Rather than lecturing about challenging decisions by trustees, this paper builds on a well-worn fictitious scenario. It was previously presented to solicitors and accountants: The Tax Institute, *WA Tax Forum*, Perth 2021; Legalwise, *Wills & Estates Summit*, Brisbane 2022; STEP SA, *Pop-Up Discussion Group*, Adelaide 2022. Thanks to Rebecca Rose and members of Brisbane's *Tributum Club* tax discussion group for comments on previous versions. I retain responsibility for any remaining errors.

For today, the attention is on aspects of litigation about which barristers are expected to have specialised knowledge. The paper has been extended and refocused, for this audience.

After this paper was settled, the New Zealand Supreme Court decided *Lambie Trustee Limited v Addleman* [2023] NZSC 7, about costs. My co-presenter, Ms Rebecca Rose, was for Mrs Addleman. The case is of importance, as an ultimate appellate decision, on trustee costs issues.

9. The trustees, growing ever older and less patient, remove Abel as a beneficiary.

10. On the passing of the trustees, Abel, as appointor, appoints his related company as replacement trustee.

11. That company appoints all property of the trust to Abel's own children (who are objects), leaving Cain destitute.

12. The detailed facts are set out in the paper and will be referred to as we progress.

13. We will not be able to cover all issues that arise from these facts but will concentrate on five or six things which we consider to be important issues that a barrister must be able to bring, to trust litigation.

2 Scale of the issue

14. Australian Taxation Office figures as at 2019-2020 showed that there were about 930,000 trusts in Australia.

15. This means that hundreds of thousands of year-end decisions are made, about who (if anyone) should benefit from trust income.

16. And this is just the beginning.

17. Operating a trust involves decisions involving value judgments. When a decision is made, someone is benefitted, and others are disappointed. Or a decision is made that affects the future direction of the trust, which can have consequences.

18. What then is the scope to review the exercise of a discretion by a trustee?

19. How can professional advisers avoid being caught up in the dangers?[2]

20. What is involved in challenging a trustee's exercise of discretion? What are the practicalities?

[2] An issue is a professional becoming knowingly concerned in a breach of fiduciary duty.

3 Who Do You Represent?

21. Private client work presents particular challenges which can be eliminated by focusing on simple questions, even if the answers appear to be inconvenient. One of those simple questions is: "Who do you represent?"

22. In litigation involving families, deep analysis is needed before you represent more than one person.

23. There are two classes of rules. The first class of rule is about conflicts of duty and duty, *per se*. The second class of rule is about information which is confidential.

24. Simply hoping that children will follow the lead of a parent, or that a spouse will agree with another spouse, does not cut it. If the interests of one family member might realistically be different from another, you do not act for both.

25. You will come under pressure to push on through these rules. Economic pressure, or potential loss of a relationship with a solicitor, do not dictate how we conduct ourselves.

26. The two groups of conduct rules are as follows:

3.1 Duties to avoid conflict

27. It is helpful to start with broad principles, contained in some of the earlier rules. Then you can move to the specific rules.

28. The *Barristers' Conduct Rules (Qd)* first provide that the barrister must "promote and protect fearlessly and by all proper and lawful means the client's best interests to the best of barrister's skill and diligence, and do so without regard to his or her own interest or to any consequences to the barrister or to any other person".[3]

[3] Rule 37.

29. More specifically, as to a prior engagement (even a prior informal discussion) - the barrister must refuse to accept, or to retain, a brief or instructions to appear before a court if, relevantly, the barrister:

    (a) has already advised or drawn pleadings for another party to the matter;[4]

    (b) has already discussed in any detail (even on an informal basis) with another party with an adverse interest in the matter the facts out which the matter arises.[5]

30. Concurrent representation is governed by rule 113 (underlining added):

> *A barrister who is briefed to appear for two or more parties in any case must determine as soon as possible whether the interests of the client may, as a real possibility, conflict and, if so, the barrister must then return the brief for:*
>
> *(a) all the clients in the case of confidentiality to which Rule 108 would apply; or*
>
> *(b) one or more of the clients so as to remove that possibility of conflict.*

3.2 Confidential information

31. Rules 95(l) & (m) (above) cross over from conflict into confidential information. Those rules require that the brief be refused, or sent back.

32. Likewise, Rule 95(a) has the same effect where the barrister has information which is confidential to any person in the case other than the prospective client, and:

    (a) the information may, as a real possibility, be material to the prospective client's case; and

    (b) the person entitled to the confidentiality has not consent to the barrister using the information as the barrister thinks fit in the case.

33. Rule 97 requires that a brief to advise be refused if the barrister has information which is confidential to any person with different interests from those of the prospective client.

4 Rule 95(l).

5 Rule 95(m).

This is again subject to two conditions, which are similar to those affecting Rule 95(a), being that:

(a) the information may, as a real possibility, affect the prospective client's interests in the matter on which advice is sought or may be detrimental to the interests of the first person (being the person whose information the barrister already had); and

(b) the person entitled to the confidentiality has not consented beforehand to the barrister using the information as the barrister thinks fit in giving advice.

34. Rule 108 prohibits:

(a) disclosure (except as compelled by law) and

(b) "use in any way",

of confidential information obtained by the barrister in the course of practice concerning any person to whom the barrister owes some duty or obligation to keep such information confidential. There are narrow exceptions.

3.3 These rules differ from those applicable to solicitors

35. The *Barristers Conduct Rules* are stricter than those applicable to solicitors. New barristers, who as former solicitors are comfortable with the *Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules*, do need to make the mindset adjustment under these stricter rules.

36. Barristers need absolutes, not matters of judgment as to whether information held might be applied "detrimentally" to the interests of the prior client, for example.[6] This hard-edged rule for barristers may be due to the imperative of the cab rank rule.

37. So, for example:

(a) I had advised an object of a trust, who happened to have the trust deed, about their rights under that trust.

[6] Compare ASCR rule 10(2)

(b) Later, I was asked independently, by other solicitors, acting for a different person, about how they could compel access to the same trust deed;

(c) My records showed that I had, in the first case, been shown at least part of the trust deed;

(d) I could recall little else about the first engagement except as recorded in a brief opinion directed to particular clauses of the deed;

(e) But I had information that required me to refuse a brief offered by the second solicitor, either under Rule 97 or Rule 108. It did not matter whether that information was potentially detrimental to the first client's interests. Unlike the ASCR, the *Barristers Conduct Rules* do not ask us to make that judgment, but ban the second brief.

3.4 Applying these rules in practice

38. In family disputes, the family - and sometimes the solicitor offering the brief - cannot see potential conflict between family members.

39. Where conflict does emerge, it is possible to injunct the legal adviser who is conflicted (or who has the prior information).[7]

40. Recent litigation in New Zealand considers whether it is relevant that lawyers continue to represent a person in that person's personal capacity, but also represent or have represented that person in a representative capacity (such as trustee or appointor).[8]

[7] *Australian Commercial Research and Development Ltd v Hampson* [1991] 1 Qd R 508 (Mackenzie J)

[8] *Addleman v Lambie Trustee Ltd* [2022] NZHC 2975, [57]-[71] (Duffy J).

4 Costs and Cost Related Orders[9]

41. Another initial step the barrister takes is to consider costs.

4.1 Own costs - costs disclosure and terms of engagement

42. I do not deal with cost disclosure here, other than to mention the need to make disclosure to any third party payer, if caught by the rule. Failure – usually by the solicitor – to comply can make costs irrecoverable contractually, necessitating assessment before suit.[10]

4.2 Particular standards applied to costs of a proceeding

43. Before anything else, consider rule 700A of the *Uniform Civil Procure Rules 1999 (Qd)*:[11]

> ***700A*** *Estates of deceased persons and trusts*
>
> *(1) This rule applies to—*
>
> *(a) a proceeding under the Succession Act 1981, part 4;*[12] *or*
>
> *(b) another proceeding relating to an interest in property under a will or trust.*
>
> *(2) Without limiting the court's discretion under these rules to make an order about costs in relation to all or part of the proceeding, the court may, in determining an order for costs, take into account the following matters—*
>
> *(a) the value of the property the subject of the proceeding and, in particular, the value of the property about which there is a disputed entitlement;*
>
> *(b) whether costs have been increased because of any one or more of the following—*
>
> *(i) noncompliance with these rules;*
>
> *(ii) noncompliance with a practice direction;*
>
> *(iii) the litigation of unmeritorious issues;*
>
> *(iv) failure to make, promptly or at all, appropriate concessions or admissions;*
>
> *(v) giving unwarranted attention to minor or peripheral issues;*
>
> *(c) an offer of settlement made by a party to the proceeding.*

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9 After this paper was finalised, the New Zealand Supreme Court decided costs in *Lambie Trustee Limited v Addleman* [2023] NZSC 7 (17 Feb. 2023). As an ultimate appellate decision, it is important in emphasising principles about costs, but could not be incorporated in detail into the body of this paper.

10 Refer to the argument, found to have merit, in *Allen v CGI Holdings Pty Ltd (No.2)* [2022] QDC 68, [57]-[58] (Porter DCJ)

11 Abbreviated here as ***UCPR (Qd)***.

12 Author's note – proceedings seeking family provision, known in NZ as family protection, and formerly known as TFM or testator's family maintenance.

44. Read the two salutary judgments about r 700A, of McGill DCJ in *Baker*.[13] In particular, amongst McGill DCJ's other pithy statements, we see a point made in relation to family provision litigation that can be generalised to all trust and estate litigation:[14]

> *Indeed, the whole point of rule 700A was to bury the idea that parties could engage in litigation under the Succession Act 1981 section 41, on the assumption that everybody's costs on an indemnity basis would be paid out of the estate, more or less regardless of the outcome.*

4.3 Particular applications to secure costs position

45. I now move to two particular kinds of costs applications which are increasingly a feature of trust litigation. *Beddoe* applications and prospective costs orders (***PCOs***) could be an entire seminar. I deal briefly with them here:

4.3.1 Beddoe applications

46. Begin with the rules governing a trustee's indemnity from the fund.[15]

47. A trustee is entitled to be indemnified from the fund against costs "reasonably incurred in and about execution of the trusts or powers".[16]

48. Rules 700 & 704 of the UCPR (Qd) provide:

> ***700*** *Trustee*
>
> *(1)This rule applies to a party who sues or is sued as trustee.*
>
> *(2)Unless the court orders otherwise, the party is entitled to have costs of the proceeding, that are not paid by someone else, paid out of the fund held by the trustee.*
>
> **…**

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13 *Baker v Baker* [2019] QDC 92; *Baker v Baker (No.2)* [2019] QDC 140. McGill DCJ refers to Rosengren DCJ's useful judgment in *Sweaney v Bailie* [2017] QDC 295. These cases about family provision can easily be generalised to family trust litigation.

14 [2019] QDC 140, [4].

15 See generally "Liquidator of a Corporate Trustee – An Australia Perspective", paper given at STEP New Zealand's Conference, 21-22 June 2018, Auckland. Available at https://davidwmarks.com/publications/

16 Section 72 of the *Trusts Act 1973 (Qd).* Check whether the jurisdiction concerned has a similar rule in a statute, or relies on the general law formulation of "properly incurred", a distinction that probably makes no difference. Check whether some special rule applies, as in the case of a managed investment scheme. And check the deed. See generally: *Park v Whyte (No.3)* [2018] 2 Qd R 475, [11]-[14], [24].

> ***704*** *Trustee*
>
> *If a party who sues or is sued as a trustee is entitled to be paid costs out of a fund held by the trustee, a costs assessor must assess the costs on the indemnity basis, unless the court orders otherwise.*

49. Rule 700 is subject to section 72 of the *Trusts Act 1973 (Qd).*

50. The latter means that the trustee is indemnified only for "expenses reasonably incurred in or about the execution of the trusts or powers".

51. Thus, a trustee is susceptible to an order that it not have its otherwise unmet costs paid from the fund.[17]

52. But the trustee prudently does not wish to take the risk of incurring costs of litigation, if there may be a finding that the trustee ought not have.

53. A trustee who contemplates suing, or who has been sued, will be concerned to know whether the trustee would be justified in incurring the legal expenses of litigation, including any costs order the trustee might suffer if unsuccessful in the litigation.

54. In Queensland, the practice and procedure on a *Beddoe*[18] application is set out in *Salmi v Sinivuori.*[19]

> *[14] An application for a Re Beddoe order must be made separately from the litigation in which the trustee is engaged and before a different judge. The applications are usually supported by advice from a qualified lawyer as to the prospects of success as well as a costs estimate and evidence as to the value of the estate.*
>
> *[15] The practice in Australia follows the English procedure which is that whilst the beneficiaries are served with a claim, neither the beneficiary against whom the trustees propose to litigate, nor those representing him, would normally be allowed to be present when the merits of the main action are discussed between the trustee's counsel and the judge because they might hear something that they should not, given that it is about the strength or weakness of the trustee's case. Whilst the beneficiary and his counsel are allowed into the hearing to address any arguments they may wish, they must then withdraw while the matter is discussed between the trustee's counsel and the judge. The beneficiary's counsel are then readmitted to be informed of the court's decision. The basic principles of natural justice mean that material placed before the judge should be kept to a minimum. In this regard, the respondents to the current application had the opportunity to put affidavit material before the court.*

17 *Park v Whyte (No.3)* [2018] 2 Qd R 475, [56]

18 *Re Beddoe* [1893] 1 Ch 547

19 [2008] QSC 321, [14]-[16] (Lyons J).

> *[16] On the hearing of a Beddoe application the court acts essentially in an "administrative capacity" and has simply to determine whether or not the proceedings should be taken. It is not the function of the court to investigate the evidence and make a finding whether or not the trustees will be successful in the litigation.*

55. The New Zealand case of *McCallum Jnr v McCallum*[20] put down some modern heresies, and also bears reading. In short, the Court of Appeal doubted authority to the effect that a *Beddoe* application should not be brought in so-called "hostile" proceedings.[21] However, an order will seldom be made in such circumstances.[22]

56. Secondly, described by the Court of Appeal as "heroic", there was a submission that *Beddoe* applications should be abolished in New Zealand.[23]

57. Before leaving this well-trodden jurisdiction to one side, we should consider what is "hostile" litigation. The recent New Zealand High Court decision of *Niven v Eron Holdings Ltd* traces the various formulations in detail,[24] but for present purposes we will consider *Alsop Wilkinson v Neary.*

58. Lightman J categorised three kinds of litigation,[25] for the purpose of analysing whether such an assurance ought to be given to a trustee about costs, in *Alsop Wilkinson v Neary* (underlining added):[26]

> *Trustees may be involved in three kinds of dispute. (1) The first (which I shall call "a trust dispute") is a dispute as to the trusts on which they hold the subject matter of the settlement. This may be "friendly" litigation involving eg the true construction of the trust instrument or some other question arising in the course of the administration of the trust; or "hostile" litigation eg a challenge in whole or in part to the validity of the settlement by the settlor on grounds of undue influence or by a trustee in bankruptcy or a defrauded creditor of the settlor, in which case the claim is that the trustees hold the trust funds as trustees for the settlor, the trustee in bankruptcy or creditor in place of or in addition to the*

20 [2021] NZCA 237; (2021) 32 FRNZ 851; approved *Lambie Trustee Limited v Addleman* [2023] NZSC 7

21 At [42]

22 At [3]

23 At [47] & [50]. I gather the concern was the lack of transparency, for those served with an application, if (as is usual in Australia) they are not shown counsel's opinion and if they are asked to leave the courtroom for a time while the principal litigation is discussed frankly.

24 [2022] NZHC 3344 (Venning J)

25 Echoing to some extent Kekewich J in *Buckton* [1907] 2 Ch. 406, 414-415.

26 [1996] 1 WLR 1220, 1223-1224

> *beneficiaries specified in the settlement. The line between friendly and hostile litigation, which is relevant as to the incidence of costs, is not always easy to draw … (2) The second (which I shall call "a beneficiaries dispute") is a dispute with one or more of the beneficiaries as to the propriety of any action which the trustees have taken or omitted to take or may or may not take in the future. This may take the form of proceedings by a beneficiary alleging breach of trust by the trustees and seeking removal of the trustees and/or damages for breach of trust. (3) The third (which I shall call "a third party dispute") is a dispute with persons, otherwise than in the capacity of beneficiaries, in respect of rights and liabilities eg in contract or tort or assumed by the trustees as such in the course of administration of the trust.*

59. Lightman J considered that the second class, a "beneficiaries dispute", should be regarded as ordinary hostile litigation, in which costs follow the event and do not come out of the trust estate.[27]

60. There is some subtlety in deciding the fate of the first class, a "trust dispute".[28] An example given by his Honour is a dispute between rival claimants to a beneficial interest in the subject matter of the trust, where his Honour was of the view that the "duty of the trustee is to remain neutral" subject to contrary direction by the Court.

61. Thus, if the trustee acted in accordance with a direction, by merely serving a defence submitting to the Court's direction and making discovery, the trustees would be entitled to an indemnity for their costs.[29] On the other hand, in that kind of scenario, if the trustees actively defended the trust and succeeded, they would be entitled to their costs out of the trust because they preserved the interests of the beneficiaries. But if they failed, they would be at risk of not having such an indemnity.

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27 At 1224G

28 At 1224-1225

29 At 1225D

4.3.2 PCO

62. Seeking a PCO or "prospective costs order" has been distinguished from a *Beddoe* application on the basis that a *Beddoe* application "does not pre-determine the order for costs in the main action", while a PCO does.[30]

63. A practical explanation of the usefulness of a PCO is:[31]

> *… a trustee who is sued for an alleged breach of trust and who has no resources to defend the suit other than the trust assets may be able to obtain [such order]…*

64. An example in Queensland, albeit unsuccessful, was *Park v Whyte*.[32] This was part of complex proceedings concerning the failure of a Gold Coast investment fund.[33] The Applicant and Respondent were 2 defendants to another person's claim. By this stage, the Applicant was in liquidation, and a receiver and manager had also been appointed to the Applicant.[34] The Respondent was a well-known insolvency firm, which had been appointed trustee of the troubled fund.

65. Jackson J describes the position as follows (underlining added):

> *[3] On 12 April 2013, under an order of the court, the applicant was removed as the trustee of a trust scheme known as "the LM Managed Performance Fund" ("MPF"). On the same day, the respondent was appointed as the trustee.*
>
> *[4] As former trustee, the applicant applies for orders that would indemnify the applicant for its costs of defending the plaintiff's claim from the property of the MPF, to be paid from time to time as the proceeding continues and those costs are incurred. I will refer to that aspect of the application as "the application for indemnity for costs". The applicant also applies for a particular order that the indemnity extend to the applicant's liquidators professional fees, (which are not legal costs) for their time and actions while engaged in the defence of the proceeding.*

66. Thus, the case had the additional complication that the Applicant had ceased to be the trustee.

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30 *Lewin on Trusts*, (19ed), [27-241]

31 Ford & Lee's *The Law of Trusts*, 3ed, [14.3480], & see the more detailed explanations at [17.280].

32 [2015] QSC 287, from [75]

33 I necessarily simplify. I cannot here do justice to the complexities of this long-running litigation.

34 There was later litigation between the receiver and manager, and the liquidators, effectively over availability of funds for remuneration, but it raised interesting GST concerns.

67. Nevertheless, Jackson J considered that "the better view is that in some circumstances it may be possible for the court to order an indemnity from the trust property before a proceeding to which the former trustee is a defendant is decided".[35]

68. In New Zealand, a PCO application, in hostile litigation, was successful in *Woodward v Smith*. In that case, Kós J made the following points:[36]

    (a) a PCO may be made regardless of the category of case (referring here to the categorisation mentioned above;

    (b) a *Beddoe* order will "not usually deal with costs the trustees are ordered to pay to other parties", whereas typically a PCO application will have two aspects:

        (i) seeking that the beneficiaries' own costs be paid out of the trust fund on an indemnity basis in any event, which may also be subject to limitations; and

        (ii) that the beneficiaries are not liable to pay costs to another party (in essence that they should have immunity).

69. Kós J went on to say at [29]:

> *As a general rule, it is only where the Judge hearing the application is satisfied that the Judge at trial could properly exercise his or her discretion only by making an order in accordance with the proposed prospective costs orders that the order will be made. It follows that only where there are very special circumstances will a PCO be made in a … category 3 case.*

70. A recent example of a partially successful PCO application, brought by beneficiaries, is *Niven v Eron Holdings Ltd.*[37]

71. Although this substantially limits PCO applications to the first two categories mentioned by Lightman J, as set out above, the possibility of seeking a PCO in any case should be kept in mind.

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35 [2015] QSC 287, [88]

36 [2014] NZHC 407; [2014] 3 NZLR 525, [26] *et seq.*

37 [2022] NZHC 3344 (Venning J)

72. Ford & Lee also give some practical guidance, that the PCO may be a revocable, interim orders, and thus requiring review.[38]

5 Essential Rules – exercise of fiduciary power

73. In the exercise of a power, a trustee must act in good faith, responsibly and reasonably.

74. The trustee must inform itself, before deciding, of matters relevant to the decision. This is not limited to matters of fact. Quite often, this will involve taking advice from experts. But it is a matter for the advisers to advise, and for the trustee to decide. There are real limits on the ability of a trustee to delegate.[39]

75. But we immediately run into complications.

5.1 Excessive and fraudulent execution of a power

76. There is a difference between excessive execution of a power (purported execution of a power in a way the law renders partially ineffective)[40] and fraud on a power. The expression "fraud on a power" is potentially misleading, and the English instead now use the expression "proper purpose rule".[41] The point is that breach of the proper purpose rule, or "fraud on a power", does not require "fraud" in the classical sense.

77. Fraud on a power is defined classically, both positively and negatively, in *Duke of Portland v Topham*.[42]

    (a) The trustee must act in good faith and sincerity, and with an entire and single view to the real purpose and object of the power.

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38 Ford & Lee's *The Law of Trusts*, 3ed, [17.280]

39 Paraphrasing *Pitt v Holt* [2013] 2 AC 108, [10].

40 *Ibid*, [80].

41 *Grandview Private Trust Co Ltd v Wen-Young Wong* [2022] UKPC 47, [55]-[56].

42 (1864) 11 HLCas 32; 11 ER 1242 ; [1864] EngR 339.

(b) A power is not to be exercised for the purpose of accomplishing any bye or sinister object, going beyond the purpose and intent of the power.

78. The difference between excessive and fraudulent execution of a power can go to whether the trustee is ultimately liable. Where there has been excessive execution of a power, the trustee is not automatically liable, but may escape liability where it has acted conscientiously in obtaining and following advice that is apparently competent, even if the advice turns out to be wrong.[43]

5.2 Relevance of failure to consider information

79. Finally, for present purposes, it may not be sufficient to prove that a trustee has failed to consider relevant information. The information must be such as would have changed the decision, not simply such as might have changed it.[44]

80. The best way to understand these concepts is to apply them in practice.[45]

6 Scenario - Unhappiness with the Wolfram Trust

6.1 Family which set up the trust

81. Mr and Mrs Wolfram set up the Wolfram Trust to provide for one of their two sons, Cain.

82. The other son was Abel.

83. Cain had been badly injured in an accident when young. His parents were concerned that he should have access to substantial capital when he was older, since he would not have the same opportunities as Abel.

84. Although Cain's injuries were principally physical, there was always concern about:

(a) how he might cope in stressful situations, and

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43 *Pitt v Holt*, above, [80].

44 *Pitt v Holt*, at [92].

45 The examples in this case study are fictitious. Any similarity in names or fact patterns with real life is coincidental.

(b) whether there was a cognitive impairment or educational disadvantage that would require more assistance in business matters.

6.2 Trustees

85. Mr and Mrs Wolfram are the trustees of the Wolfram Trust. They are now elderly.

6.3 Investments

86. The deed provided that the trust fund might be invested in land and in securities, in addition to the usual cash assets.

87. One half of the original trust capital, $10 million, was invested in shares in Dud Properties Pty Ltd (the ***Dud Investment***), a speculative property vehicle controlled by Mr and Mrs Wolfram's brother-in-law, Mr Dud.

88. The other half, $10 million, has been profitably invested directly in land on the outskirts of Adelaide (the ***Direct Property***). It has benefited from successive town planning decisions enabling the land to be subdivided with enormous success.

6.4 Named beneficiaries

89. Mr and Mrs Wolfram never referred to this trust when speaking to Abel.

90. It was kept secret from Cain until he achieved his majority.

91. The primary income & capital beneficiaries of the Wolfram Trust were named as Cain & Abel.

92. There are then tiers of other relatives also named as beneficiaries.

93. Primary beneficiaries take unless income is appointed away by year end: likewise capital, unless otherwise appointed before the vesting date.

94. Lower tiers of beneficiaries, such as any children of Cain or Abel (as the second tier), only become default income and capital beneficiaries if all beneficiaries in all higher tiers have died. All tiers of beneficiaries are objects of discretion (whilst alive).

6.5 Developments with investments

6.5.1 Dud Investment

95. The Dud Investment soured, losing half the capital so invested.

96. Mr and Mrs Wolfram had invested $10 million of the trust's capital in shares in Dud Properties Pty Ltd.

97. They regret that they did not insist on having a seat on the board of that company.

98. They have not insisted on seeing financial reports.

99. They simply trusted their brother-in-law. But he made some elementary errors in the approach he took to property investment through Dud Properties Pty Ltd, leading to the substantial losses.

6.5.2 Direct Property

100. On the other hand, the Direct Property investments have been supervised closely by Mr and Mrs Wolfram, albeit with the usual consultants providing assistance. These have enjoyed enormous success.

6.6 Appointments of income

101. Income of the Wolfram Trust was never appointed in favour of Abel.

102. Further, a view was taken that the trust fell within the excepted income provisions, as the seed capital came from the personal injury compensation paid in favour of Cain. Thus, substantial distributions were made each year to Cain to provide ongoing medical expenses and assistance with his particular educational and social needs.

6.7 Abel finds out

103. Twenty years on, Cain and Abel live in different countries. They rarely speak.

104. Cain never married, in part owing to his childhood injuries, but Cain retained a vital interest in the property development activities which continued to occur through the Wolfram Family Trust. Cain has gathered around him a group of trusted professional advisers, in relation to his legal and accounting requirements, but also his property development activities.

105. Abel married and has children who are potential objects of discretion under the Wolfram Family Trust. But he has only just learned of the existence of this trust.

106. Abel wonders why he has never been told about this trust. He learned about it only through a careless line in a newspaper report concerning the fabulous wealth generated over the past decades through Cain and his parents' efforts concerning the Direct Property.

107. Abel has his solicitor write to Cain enquiring whether Abel and his family are beneficiaries or objects of discretion under the Wolfram Trust. On the assumption that they are, the solicitors ask for the trust deed and full accounts of the trust back to the time when the trust was settled.

7 Immediate Areas of Dispute

108. From the above facts, we can see that the trustee may fall into dispute with Abel about:

    (a) whether Abel has been properly considered for distributions, and how he and his children might be considered for distributions in future; and

    (b) the monumental losses incurred by the trust through the Dud Investment.

109. Cain may also attempt to join the fray, in his capacity as a beneficiary. There are limits to his ability to do so. But he will likely be joined in any proceedings, and he will have to decide whether he takes an active part in such proceedings. There are significant costs

consequences of a decision to take an active part in such proceedings. The decision is not taken lightly.

110. But the first point which may divide the parties is access to information. It is fundamental that the actions of a trustee or fiduciary should be capable of review.[46]

111. Without basic information, such as whether Abel is a beneficiary or object of discretion, Abel is hamstrung in questioning the of the affairs of the trust.

8 Access to Information

112. Accessing information is a vital step toward articulating complaints about trustee exercises of discretion or misfeasance. Without information, a beneficiary cannot hold a trustee to account. This was fundamental to the reasoning in *Armitage v Nurse*.[47]

8.1 Duty to inform beneficiaries of their rights

8.1.1 Principles in Queensland

113. The position differs between an object of discretion, and a beneficiary of a strict trust. These might be regarded as extremes, on a range.

114. A beneficiary of a strict trust must be informed by the trustee of his rights under the trust when of full age and capacity.[48]

115. The position for objects of discretion, on the other hand, is not as clear. The obligation to tell a mere object, of the possibility that he might be considered for a distribution, was again left unexplained in *Segelov v Ernst & Young Services Pty Ltd*.[49] Gleeson JA said:

> *It is, however, a much larger step to suggest that in all trusts a beneficiary's right to inspect the trust documents, including the trust deed, gives rise to a corresponding duty of disclosure owed by the trustee to the beneficiary to have*

46 *Armitage v Nurse* [1998] Ch 241, 253, speaking of an irreducible core of obligations. There, the context was a broad exemption clause in a trust deed. As to provision of information in England, see *Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd* [2003] 2 AC 709.

47 [1998] Ch 241, 253.

48 *Re Emmet's Estate* (1881) 17 ChD 142, 149. See also Ford & Lee, *Law of Trusts*, [9.4610].

49 (2015) 89 NSWLR 431 (NSWCA).

> *his or her rights explained to them, including in the case of potential objects of a discretionary trust their entitlement to an interest in the trust fund once determined by the trustee. … This contention should be rejected. To accept such a proposition would be to impose a duty on trustees without regard to the nature and the terms of the relevant trust and social or business environment in which the trust operates …*

8.1.2 Beware – special rules interstate and overseas

116. In South Australia, section 84B(2)(c) of the *Trustee Act 1936 (SA)* requires the trustee, at the request of a beneficiary under the trust, to produce records kept under section 84B. Failure to do so is a criminal offence. The beneficiary may examine or make copies of those records.

117. Regulation 5 of the *Trustee Regulations 2011 (SA)* states the records that a trustee must keep relating to administration of the trust property for the purposes of section 84B.

118. Although the wording of this provision is somewhat peculiar, it would appear that the trust deed must be produced upon request by a beneficiary under section 84B(2), as well as a record of all reviews of investments (which must be annual, at least, as we shall see); any instrument varying distribution of the trust property; and "trust statements" which appears to be a blend of a cashbook, balance sheet, cashflow statement, and record of other property received or transferred.

119. Nevertheless, a beneficiary has to know to enquire under section 84B. There will always be a question as to whether a beneficiary or object must be informed of its entitlement.

120. In New Zealand, the new *Trusts Act 2019* creates a presumption that the trustee must make available to every beneficiary certain listed basic trust information, including the fact that a person is a beneficiary of the trust.[50] There is then a presumption that a trustee must, within a reasonable period of time, give a beneficiary the trust information that a

[50] Cf section 51 of the *Trusts Act 2019 (NZ).*

person has requested. There are listed factors for deciding whether the presumption applies.[51]

121. Therefore, always ascertain the systems of law with which the trust, and potentially those dealing with the trust, have contact. If necessary, brief interstate or overseas counsel to advise on local laws.

8.1.3 Right to be told here?

122. In the present case, if Cain was a default beneficiary as to capital, with his brother Abel, then arguably both were entitled to be told of their respective beneficial, vested interests upon attaining majority.

123. Cain was told.

124. Abel was not. Abel was thus never able to make representations to the trustees as to his needs, if any, which could have been met using discretionary powers to appoint income or capital.

125. What of the children of Abel?

126. Abel's children might (during Cain and Abel's lives) effectively only be objects of discretion as to income, or as to capital, and might yet not have attained majority.

127. Real problems arise where such persons are also second or lower tier default beneficiaries, ranking behind, say, their parents. They have only a contingent interest (dependent upon surviving other lives in being). And such a contingent interest is also liable to be defeated by appointment in favour of a discretionary object.

128. Therefore, it is difficult to find, let alone formulate, hard and fast rules admitting of no exceptions in this field.

[51] Sections 52-55.

129. Some of the case law about the rights of those who take only in the event of the happening of a contingency does look decidedly dated in the face of the modern discretionary trust deed.[52]

130. Indeed, some of the distinctions drawn in the cases not only look dated but are also decidedly difficult to apply in practice.

131. Thus, in *Schmidt v Rosewood*, the person seeking disclosure of trust documents was not yet named as a beneficiary under one of the true settlements concerned. (There was power to name that person as beneficiary, but it had not yet been exercised.) The applicant was nevertheless successful.[53]

132. Again, this is subject to section 84B of the *Trustee Act 1936 (SA)*, and Regulation 5. Those provisions overlay discussion under the succeeding subheadings as well.

8.2 "Trust documents"

133. I now turn to rights to see documents.

134. The first issue is whether a document is a "trust document", or something private to the trustees.

135. The New South Wales Court of Appeal decision of *Hartigan Nominees Pty Ltd v Rydge*[54] gives examples of documents that may be property of the trustees, and may have come into existence in relation to the administration of the trust, but which nevertheless will not be a "trust document". These include:

    (a) a letter from a possible beneficiary conveying information about the beneficiary's circumstances;

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52 *Re Tillott* [1892] 1 Ch 86; *Re Dartnall* [1895] 1 Ch 474. See also Heydon & Leeming, *Jacobs' Law of Trusts in Australia* (8th Edition), page 350, paragraph 17-15, footnote 135; Dal Pont, *Equity and Trusts in Australia* (8th Edition), paragraphs [20.30]-[20.40].

53 [2003] 2 AC 709.

54 (1992) 29 NSWLR 405, 433.

(b) a note for or by a trustee of discussions with other beneficiaries to assist the trustee to decide how to exercise a discretionary power; and

(c) a memorandum of wishes.[55]

8.3 "Confidential" trust documents

136. Next, there are questions of confidentiality, which may justify withholding a document from a beneficiary.[56]

137. In *Hartigan Nominees*, much of the debate was about a memorandum of wishes. As seen above, this was not a "trust document".

138. But you could also imagine a case where disclosure of information, or a document, such as a secret recipe or other confidential information, could cause jeopardy to the other beneficiaries and objects.

139. Yet, the document recording the secret recipe would be a "trust document".

140. A good example was the South Australian Full Court decision, *Rouse v IOOF Australia Trustees Limited*.[57] The trustee acted for investors in a forestry project. The trustee was suing people. There was a question about whether the trustee ought to provide information to beneficiaries about that litigation, including the brief to counsel.

141. Critically, the beneficiaries had not claimed that they had been prevented from exercising rights under the trust deed. Nor did they claim that their attempts to exercise such rights had been frustrated.

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55 *Ibid*, page 437.

56 *Ibid*, at 433F.

57 (1999) 73 SASR 484.

142. They had not shown that reasonable requests for information, about the course of the litigation, had been rejected. Such reasonable requests were distinguished by the Full Federal Court from requests for access to particular primary documents.[58]

143. Giving the principal judgment of the Full Court, the Doyle CJ said that the trustee was entitled to refuse access to trust documents (in cases going beyond a necessity to maintain confidentiality in the reasons for exercise of a discretion).[59]

144. Doyle CJ said (underlining added):[60]

> *There must be various situations in which a trustee, particularly a trustee conducting a business, would be put in an impossible position if the beneficiary of the trust could, as a matter of right, claim to inspect documents in the possession of the trustee and relevant to the conduct of the business. It is readily conceivable that there will be situations in which an undertaking of confidentiality is not sufficient protection. The fact that the trust is one in which numerous beneficiaries have an interest, and the further fact that those beneficiaries may have differing views about the wisdom of the course of action being pursued by the trustee, only served to emphasise, in my opinion, the need for the law to recognise some scope for a trustee to refuse to disclose information on the grounds that it is confidential and on the further ground that the disclosure <u>is not in the interests of the beneficiaries as a whole</u>.*

8.4 Theoretical basis for beneficiary access to documents

145. We have now dealt with the issues of whether something is a "trust document" and whether something should otherwise not be disclosed because it is "confidential".

146. We now get to the difficult question: the basis upon which a beneficiary may assert an entitlement to see a trust document, absent any threat to litigation.

147. *Rouse* adverts to, but does not decide, whether the claimed entitlement must be decided by reference to whether a beneficiary has a <u>proprietary interest</u> in a trust document, or on the basis that a fiduciary must be ready with his accounts.[61]

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58 *Ibid*, [74].

59 Ibid, [98].

60 Ibid, [100].

61 See the discussion in *Rouse*, ibid, [88]-[92].

148. The seachange in favour of a flexible approach, requiring disclosure to the extent necessary to enable a beneficiary or object to hold a trustee to account, came in the Privy Council decision, *Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd*, an appeal from the Isle of Man.[62]

> *Their Lordships have already indicated their view that a beneficiary's right to seek disclosure of trust documents, although sometimes not inappropriately described as a proprietary right, is best approached as one aspect of the court's inherent jurisdiction to supervise, and where appropriate intervene in, the administration of trusts. There is therefore in their Lordships' view no reason to draw any bright dividing line either between transmissible and non-transmissible (that is, discretionary) interests, or between the rights of an object of a discretionary trust and those of the object of a mere power (of a fiduciary character).* …
>
> *… [No] beneficiary (and least of all a discretionary object) has any entitlement as of right to disclosure of anything which can plausibly be described as a trust document. Especially when there are issues as to personal or commercial confidentiality, the court may have to balance the competing interests of different beneficiaries, the trustees themselves, and third parties. Disclosure may have to be limited and safeguards may have to be put in place. Evaluation of the claims of a beneficiary (and especially of a discretionary object) may be an important part of the balancing exercise which the court has to perform on the materials placed before it. In many cases the court may no difficulty in concluding that an applicant with no more than a theoretical possibility of benefit ought not to be granted any relief.*

149. A decision of the Privy Council does not bind an Australian court, at least where given on appeal from a different country. But a decision of this ultimate appellate court can be persuasive.[63]

150. There has been a recent case sticking with a proprietary approach in Australia: *Chan v Valmorbida Custodians Pty Ltd*.[64] But the authorities are split on the point.

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62 [2003] 2 AC 709.

63 A decision of the Privy Council, given on Australian law before termination of appeals to that body, can be highly persuasive, if not in conflict with a decision of the High Court of Australia: *Viro v The Queen* (1978) 141 CLR 88. This decision is not in that category, given after termination of appeals.

Thus, we do not have to resolve a conflict in the authorities on a subsidiary point: On one view, unless the High Court of Australia has also spoken, such a decision of the Privy Council binds the Supreme Court of Queensland: *Sun North Investments v Dale* [2014] 1 QdR 369, [113] & fn 49. Opposite views have been expressed by individual judges interstate: *Hawkins v Clayton* (1986) 5 NSWLR 109, 136-137 (McHugh JA) & *R v Judge Bland; Ex parte Director of Public Prosecutions* [1987] VR 225, 231-232.

64 [2020] VSC 590, [71].

151. Pragmatically, there is much to commend the decision of Colvin J in *Thomson v Colonial First State Investments Ltd (No. 2).*[65] After noting the difference in views between the proprietary theory and the more flexible approach, the court pointed out that "the supervisory jurisdiction extends to being able to compel a trustee to provide information". Thus, it might be that parties with a proprietary interest have a right to access documents, and parties with a lesser interest will need to persuade the court "that it is necessary or appropriate to do so in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction".

152. I think we will eventually go down the more flexible course. And I think we will follow the New Zealand Supreme Court.

153. We are seeing citations in Australia[66] of the New Zealand Supreme Court decision, *Erceg*.[67]

154. *Erceg* involves a multi-factorial approach, which I consider gives effect to *Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd*. The New Zealand Supreme Court draws together the various threads in the cases. The matters that need to be evaluated in relation to an application for the disclosure of trust documents include the following:[68]

    (a) What documents are sought? If a number of documents are sought, decisions may need to be made about each document or class of documents. This is because different considerations might apply to the basic documents such as a trust deed, and "more remote documents" such as a memorandum of wishes.

    (b) The context of the request, and the objective of the beneficiary in making the request. A case for disclosure will be more compelling if it is otherwise not possible to monitor the trustee's compliance with the trust deed. It might also be relevant

65 (2021) 153 ACSR 663, [62]-[65].

66 *Smorgon v ES Group Operations Pty Ltd* (2021) 64 VR 146, [137], [145].

67 [2017] 1 NZLR 320.

68 *Ibid*, [56].

that disclosure has been made to other beneficiaries, though that is unlikely to be a decisive factor against disclosure, so long as there is no improper motive on the part of the applicant beneficiary.

(c) Nature of interest of beneficiary seeking access. The "degree of proximity" of the beneficiary to the trust, or the likelihood of the beneficiary (or others in the same class as that beneficiary) benefitting from the trust is a relevant factor.

(d) Any issues of personal or commercial confidentiality? The court will take account of the need to protect such matters. It will also look for any indications in the trust deed relevant to the need for confidentiality for such matters.

(e) Any practical difficulty in providing the information. The court will look at any difficulty or expense that may be caused in doing so.

(f) Whether the documents sought will disclose trustee's reasons for decisions made by them. The New Zealand Supreme Court follows earlier authority, but in a qualified way, in saying that it would "not normally be appropriate to require disclosure of the trustee's reasons for particular decisions.

(g) Likely impact on trustee and other beneficiaries if disclosure made. In particular, the focus is on whether there would be an adverse impact <u>on the beneficiaries as a whole</u>. A balancing exercise is involved. The New Zealand Supreme Court was prepared to take into account the possibility of disclosure making family relationships more difficult, if it was a family trust, including the relationship between trustees and beneficiaries if that would be to the detriment of beneficiaries as a whole. However non-disclosure is recognised as possibly having a similar effect.

(h) Likely impact on settlor and third parties.

(i) Whether disclosure can be made while still protecting confidentiality. Here we are talking about possible redactions. Also see the next point.

(j) Imposing safeguards? Things the New Zealand Supreme Court was prepared to consider included undertakings and a provision for inspection of documents only by professional advisers.

8.5 Claims of privilege

155. Overlaying the debate about entitlement to trust information and trust documents would be any claim for legal professional privilege on the part of the trustees, as against the beneficiaries.

156. A recent New Zealand Supreme Court authority, *Lambie Trust Ltd v Addleman*, follows what I considered to be orthodox lines, according to the literature, but is significant as being the first ultimate appellate court decision on issues of joint privilege between beneficiaries and trustees, at least in the context of now heated litigation.[69]

157. It upholds the idea that advice for which the trustees have sought indemnity from the trust fund will generally be the subject of a joint privilege, shared between the trustee and the beneficiaries. Thus, the trustee cannot claim privilege as against the object or beneficiary.[70]

158. Unfortunately, it is not as simple as that. Trustees may be in litigation against a beneficiary, and may be properly defending their actions using the resources of the trust to do so. In that case, the trustees will be entitled to assert legal professional privilege, as against the litigious beneficiary.[71]

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69 [2021] 1 NZLR 307.

70 This accords with the leading text, Passmore, *Privilege*, (4th Edition), paragraph 6-022.

71 [2021] 1 NZLR 307 and see also *Dawson-Damer v Taylor Wessing* [2020] Ch 746. I have simplified the analysis, as this article is not about access to trust information as such, but rather this article means to signpost areas of potential dispute in gaining access to trust documents and information.

159. The New Zealand Supreme Court said that, with one exception involving an unusual fact pattern, a beneficiary would not have a joint interest in trustee-commissioned legal advice received after litigation had been commenced ("or perhaps when it was very imminent"). The Court did say that there was little help in the case law "as to the persistence of the joint interest in the period between contemplation and commencement of litigation".[72]

160. The New Zealand Supreme Court invited submissions about a particular period relevant to the facts of that case. I gather that the trustees filed such submissions. No decision from the court has been received about that controversial period, and any advices that might have been received during that period. We await developments.[73]

161. In summary, where litigation is against a third party (not a beneficiary requesting information or documents), a beneficiary may be denied access, where the requesting beneficiary may use the documents to prejudice the trustee in its conduct of the litigation, or prejudice other beneficiaries.[74]

162. Where the litigation is against the requesting beneficiary, the beneficiary is not entitled to advice sought by the trustee about the substance of a dispute with the trustee.[75]

163. A final point remains unresolved. This is the case where a trustee (or prospective trustee) pays for legal advice itself. It might want to know, privately, what its responsibilities or downsides are, personally, of doing something.

164. I gather there is a view that such advice, though privileged, might be accessed by a beneficiary, as subject to joint privilege with the beneficiaries. For myself, I should think

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72 [2021] 1 NZLR 307, [91].

73 This separate issue has now been reserved by the New Zealand Supreme Court since 1 June 2021. This paper is being settled in January 2023.

74 *Webster v Murray Goulburn Co-op* [2018] FCA 990.

75 Passmore, *Privilege* (4th Edition), paragraph 6-022.

that would be a hard result, and contrary to the point of the privilege – to enable a person to obtain frank advice from a lawyer about one's own position.

165. Nevertheless, the question was distinctly raised (though not finally answered) in *Lambie Trust Ltd v Addleman*, in the reasons of the New Zealand Supreme Court. In argument, Mr Ross QC for the respondent said at page 312:

> *If the advice relates to the administration of the trust it is trust property even if the trustee pays for it (Re Arpettaz Settlement [2020] JRC 161 at [8], [51]-[53]).*

166. Delivering the judgment of the New Zealand Supreme Court, William Young J said at [51]:

> *That said, where the information consists of legal advice, some considerations (for instance who paid for the advice) may be material to both issues. As a rough rule of thumb, advice paid for using trust money is most unlikely to be personal to a trustee. This is because trustees must not use trust funds for their own purposes.*

167. Significantly, however, William Young J added footnote 33 as follows:

> *This may not work the other way and advice paid for by a trustee may nevertheless be a trustee information.*

9 Disappointment with Investments

168. The power to invest is administrative, not donative. But many administrative powers are important, too.

169. While the Direct Property has done fantastically well, recall that the Dud Investment was unsuccessful.

9.1 Development in scenario - Abel gets accounts

170. As a default beneficiary attempting to investigate, for the first time, his rights and entitlements under the trust, Abel will have access to the accounts. And the accounts must be disclosed to him without time limit, in principle.[76]

[76] Compare *Addleman v Lambie Trustee Ltd* [2019] NZCA 480, [23]. Note in South Australia that there are specific regulations dealing with record keeping, which at least provide some finality after termination of the trust. In accordance with the *Trustee Regulations 2011 (SA)*, section 5(3), the records referred to in the Regulation "must be retained by the trustee … for at least five years after the termination of the trust". Recall that South Australia has abolished the rule against perpetuities. It is possible that records of a

171. Abel will have access to the trust deed, to know the extent and nature of his entitlement.

172. On perusing the accounts, Abel will doubtless understand that the trustees invested half the initial fund in Dud Properties Pty Ltd, a proprietary company whose connection with the family will be obvious from search.

173. The accounts may reveal the losses; or his investigations (including a request to the trustee to provide the accounts of Dud Properties Pty Ltd)[77] may show the losses.

9.2 Standard

174. In the mid to late 1990s, the Australian States followed New Zealand law reform, and introduced template laws modernising the rules about trust investment.[78] The laws were changed in each State over a period of time, and it is necessary to study the legislative history carefully in the State with which the trust has connection. The reform in Queensland was enacted by the same pattern legislation as the *Trusts (Investments) Amendment Act 1999*, but commencing 3 February 2000.[79]

175. For ease of reference, I will refer to the present trust investment law as the ***post-1999 Queensland law***. And for ease of analysis, we will assume that the post-1999 Queensland law applies.

176. Nevertheless, I must mention for comparison the state of the law immediately prior, since the new law assumes that the older standard applies to some extent.

177. Under section 21 of the *Trusts Act 1973 (Qd)*, the law has been modified so that a trustee may (unless expressly forbidden by the instrument creating the trust) invest trust funds in

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trustee will need to be maintained forever, but that may well be the position under the general law anyway, subject only to discretionary defences such as laches.

77 This was the course taken in *Addleman v Lambie Trustee Ltd* [2017] NZHC 2054, [23].

78 Ford & Lee, *Law of Trusts*, paragraph 10.1000. The New Zealand reforms of 1988 have themselves been overtaken by section 30 of the *Trusts Act 2019 (NZ).*

79 *Act No. 69 of 1999* was commenced by proclamation reference 2000 SL No. 16.

any form of investment. The trustee can vary or realise an investment, and re-invest an amount resulting from the realisation in any form of investment.

178. The prior rule confined the trustee in the sorts of investments that could be made, but there was a statutory power to invest in certain authorised securities. That concept is no longer retained.

179. Despite this apparent freedom under section 21, the trustee is nevertheless subject to duties in exercising a power of investment in accordance with section 22. A non-professional trustee (which we will assume for the purposes of this exercise is applicable to the facts discussed today), is held to this standard – the trustee must:

> *Exercise the care, diligence and skill a prudent person of business would exercise in managing the affairs of other persons.*

180. Section 22 also refers the trustee back to the trust deed, requiring the trustee to comply with a provision of the instrument creating the trust, if there is a provision requiring consent or approval, or compliance with a direction, for trust investments.

181. Finally, under section 22(3), the trustee must <u>at least once in each year</u> review the performance, individually and as a whole, of trust investments.

182. Under the general law, before the law reform that commenced in 2000, Abel was not obliged to give credit to the trustees for success, and could attack their failures without set-off.[80]

183. Now, on a discretionary basis, the court may allow set-off. The matters to which the court has regard under section 30C appear to be listed by section 30B:

(a) the nature and purpose of the trust;

(b) whether the trustee had regard to the matters set out in section 24 (see below) so far as appropriate to the circumstances of the trust;

[80] Ford & Lee, *Law of Trusts*, paragraph 10.18120.

(c) whether the trust investments had been made under an investment strategy. Sections 23 and 24 contemplate the trustee recovering reasonable costs of obtaining advice;

(d) the extent the trustee acted on the independent and impartial advice of a person competent (or apparently competent) to give advice.

184. Reference is made above to having regard to matters set out in section 24 of the Act:

(a) the purposes of the trust and the needs and circumstances of the beneficiaries;

(b) the desirability of diversifying trust investments;

(c) the nature of and risk associated with existing trust investments and other trust properties;

(d) the need to maintain the real value of the capital or income of the trust;

(e) the risk of capital or income loss or depreciation;

(f) the potential for capital appreciation;

(g) the likely income return and the timing of income return;

(h) the length of the term of the proposed investment;

(i) the probable duration of the trust;

(j) the liquidity and marketability of the proposed investment during, and at the end of, the term of the proposed investment;

(k) the total value of the trust estate;

(l) the effect of the proposed investment for the tax liability of the trust;

(m) the likelihood of inflation affecting the value of the proposed investment or other trust property;

(n) the cost (including commissions, fees, charges and duties payable) of making the proposed investment;

(o) the results of a review of existing trust investments. (Note again the obligation under section 22(3) upon the trustee, at least once in each year, to review the performance, individually and as a whole, of trust investments.)

9.3 Review of the investment decision – Dud Investment

185. The halving of the value of the Dud Investment can be attacked with ease, but defended only meticulously and at expense.

186. A basic issue here was lack of diversification, contrary to section 24(1)(b). Property development might also be said to involve high risk, with consequent risk of loss of capital and thus loss of ongoing income: section 24(1)(e).

187. Thus, making such an investment, and retaining it, requires a balancing act between risk and return overall. Half the fund went into an illiquid, high-risk investment run by the brother-in-law. Worse, the trustees admit they ought to have better supervised the Dud Investment. After all, the property development they made directly themselves, prospered, and they are in danger of being held to a higher standard as experienced investors. (Section 22(1)(a) imposes a higher standard on trustees whose profession, business or employment is, or includes, "acting as a trustee or investing money for other persons".)

188. Under the general law, the trustee is obliged to supervise the investment, if made through a company. This is so at least where there is capacity to control the company. As is explained in Gallagher, *Equity and Trusts in Hong Kong*:[81]

> *… if a trust has a large investment in shares of a company, the share ownership usually comes with consequent right to vote and control the company's actions. As it is generally accepted that the starting point for trustees in their duties to the trust is to safeguard the trust and ensure its investments is protected, this is interpreted as a duty to monitor any underlying corporate structure. However, many family trusts are settled with shares in underlying family companies, and*

[81] 2nd Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, paragraph 17.12.2.

> *the settlors often wish to retain their control over the actions of the underlying company free from interference from the trustees …*

189. This follows from the leading English case, *Bartlett v Barclays Trust Co (No. 1).*[82]

190. Some trust deeds attempt to overcome the onerous duties of a trustee, to supervise investments made through a company such as Dud Properties Pty Ltd, by a so-called "anti-Bartlett" clause. Such a clause was upheld by the Hong Court of Final Appeal in 2019.[83] While that decision will be highly persuasive, it is untested in Australia.

191. The remedy which was sought in that case was to have the trustees reconstitute the fund. In the present case, such a liability would be ruinous for the non-professional trustees of the Wolfram Trust.

192. It would be said against the trustees that they ought not to have made the investment, and (in any case) ought to have supervised it more carefully.

193. Once upon a time, the beneficiary would bring an action for administration of the trust, but stay all except the question of reconstituting the fund due to failed investments. Nowadays, an efficient way of seeking remedy in Queensland is by application under section 8 of the *Trusts Act 1973*. The analogue was section 94 of the *Trustees Act 1962 (WA)*, but Queensland has gone a step further in allowing the exercise of non-statutory powers also to be reviewed by this simplified means.

194. In other States, longer form proceedings would still be commenced, instead.

195. In short, the proceedings would call into question, and seek remedy for, the unsuccessful investment in the Dud Investment.

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82 [1980] Ch 515.

83 *Zhang Hong Li v DBS Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd* [2019] HKCFA 45.

10 Reviewing Exclusion as Beneficiary

10.1 Development in scenario – removal of Abel as beneficiary

196. A discretionary trust contains powers to appoint income, capital, or both. Often Australian trust deeds contain provisions stating which beneficiaries (and in which order of priority) will take in default of a valid appointment of the income, the capital, or both.

197. In the present scenario, the trustees are the parents of Abel and Cain. The parents are now old and frail.

198. They have been concerned about Abel's request for information. They have now been served with legal process calling into question the investment decisions (including supervision of the investments) to do with the Dud Investment.

199. They consult their lawyers and express the view that Abel should be removed as a beneficiary.

200. The lawyers point out the complications with stamp duty and direct taxes. They also point out that the question is timely, since Abel now lives overseas. In some of the States where the trust holds land, there are provisions penalising the trustees of a trust that owns land if a beneficiary is a foreigner. Abel falls within the definition of "foreigner" for these purposes.

201. At this stage, it seems that the advisers have overlooked removing Abel's children. (More of that below.)

202. Can the trustees exercise the following power to exclude Abel from any further benefit?[84]

> *The Trustee may at any time exclude a beneficiary from the class of beneficiaries hereunder and such person shall not thereafter form a member of the class of General Beneficiaries for the purpose of this Deed and no further sums whether of income or of capital shall be allocated set aside paid to or otherwise applied to or for the benefit of such persons provided however that any such notice shall not*

[84] This has been adapted from a clause in a model deed in Grbich, Munn & Reicher, *Modern Trusts and Taxation*, Butterworths, 1978, pages 294-295. The model clause was a self-exclusion clause, able to be used by the beneficiary. I have changed it to be a clause enabling the trustee to exclude.

> *affect the beneficial entitlement to any amount set aside for such beneficiary or amount held in trust for such beneficiary.*

10.2 Powers of exclusion

203. The above power is not uncommon. It was useful where having someone as a beneficiary jeopardised the future of a trust, say in a tax haven. I have also seen such a clause used to cut off a sibling who had had her portion (from other sources), so as to simplify her life in the high-tax jurisdiction to which she had moved. Such powers have now come into their own given surcharges and levies based on a beneficiary being a foreigner.

204. In the present case, it is apparent that the trustees could have two reasons for acting to remove Abel, the foreigner.

205. The first reason concerns the substantial additional land tax levy payable each year in the State where some of the real property is located.

206. The second reason that they might think to act is to remove a beneficiary from future benefit in a case where his actions are causing disturbance to them, as trustees.

207. One would have thought that the latter reason is not a good reason to act. On the face of it, a beneficiary who is simply trying to hold trustees to account, by asking measured questions about the investments and trust documents, is doing no more than the beneficiary is entitled to do.

208. The kind of dispute does happen.

209. In *Curwen v Vanbreck Pty Ltd*,[85] the trust deed empowered the trustee, in its absolute and uncontrolled discretion, to exclude from the class of beneficiaries a person who would otherwise be a beneficiary.

210. A dispute arose among the family about the directorship of the trustee company. One of the brothers made a formal request to access trust documents.

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[85] (2009) 26 VR 335; 4 ASTLR 71; [2009] VSCA 284.

211. Shortly afterward, and without giving a reason, the trustee exercised its power to exclude that person as well as his brother as beneficiaries. The first brother had not even been given access to the trust documents.

10.2.1 Principles for deciding these cases

212. As with many cases about powers, the questions revolve around whether the disappointed beneficiary can show that the power (here a power of exclusion) had been exercised for some purpose other than a proper purpose. Often, this will come down to the construction of the trust deed as a whole, and to matters of inference that the court is invited to draw.

213. An important question is whether the rule in *Jones v Dunkel* applies. In most civil litigation, an inference might be drawn from the failure to tender a document or call a witness, where that document or witness might be adverse to the defendant's case.[86]

214. If such an inference were available here, it would be valuable, as you may not get reasons from the trustee about why it exercised a power, and thus may be unable properly to commence litigation absent any other factual basis.

215. Recall that such reasons are regarded as private documents, and not trust documents, and thus probably will not be given to a beneficiary when disclosing "trust documents". Also, however, note that in the course of civil litigation, disclosure obligations may turn up such documents, even if they are not trust documents to which a beneficiary is entitled in the absence of litigation. But to commence litigation, without evidence, is a serious matter.

216. But the Victorian Court of Appeal has recently confirmed that the *Jones v Dunkel* inference is not available in circumstances where the trustees were not obliged to give reasons. Refer *Owies v JJE Nominees Pty Ltd* [2022] VSCA 142, [119]. Nevertheless, standing mute does have some consequence for a trustee as the Court of Appeal said:[87]

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86 *Jones v Dunkel* (1959) 101 CLR 298.

87 At [133].

> *Ultimately, the trustee chose not to explain its reasons, leaving the stark pattern of distributions to speak for itself.*

217. I return to *Curwen v Vanbreck*, above. The Victorian Court of Appeal said that the former beneficiaries in that case had the onus to establish that the trustee's exercise of discretion was not made for a proper purpose.[88]

218. What the beneficiary in that case had to establish was a fraud on a power. Classically, that required that the former beneficiary established that the trustee has trespassed beyond what is permitted in this sense:[89]

> *The donee of a limited power must exercise it bona fide for the end designed by the donor, which requires that the power can be exercised only in favour of the objects of that power and in furtherance of the purpose for which it is conferred. If the donee, in good faith, exercises a power in favour of a stranger or in some other way which is not consistent with the terms and scope of his power, such exercise … is excessive. If, however, the donee deliberately attempts "to secure the effect of an excessive execution without actually making one", the exercise of the power is not simply excessive: it is in fact fraudulent and void.*

219. The above passage about defective exercise of a power does not take into account the peculiar feature of a power of exclusion, that the person excluded will quite often not benefit, though that person was originally a beneficiary or object.

220. The difference between an excessive appointment, and a fraudulent appointment, can be difficult to discern. For the purposes of this exercise, we have been let inside the solicitor's office to listen to the conversation between the elderly trustees and the long-time adviser, and we know the two reasons possibly actuating the trustees to act to remove Abel as a beneficiary.

221. The trustees have now excluded Abel but have not provided any reasons to Abel. They have provided him with a brief letter pointing to the power in the trust deed and the fact of its execution depriving him of any further benefit under the trust deed.

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88 At [30].

89 Thomas, *Thomas on Powers* (2nd Edition), page 400.

10.2.2 Result in *Curwen v Vanbreck*

222. The Victorian Court of Appeal said that if a trustee, in deciding to exercise the power, "acted upon the dual consideration of whether the beneficiaries ought to be entitled to a potential distribution of trust assets and whether those beneficiaries ought to be given access to trust documents, so that the latter consideration should be regarded as part of the trustee's primary intention, it would be an invalid exercise of power".[90]

223. In other words, there was no requirement that the improper purpose be the "primary or dominant purpose". The improper purpose "will constitute a fraud on the power if it be an operative or actuating purpose".

224. So in the present case, if an operative or actuating purpose was to retaliate against Abel for his requests for documents, or for his seeking to review investment decisions, it does not matter that there is another perfectly good reason, being the desire to save the trust as a whole from heavy annual taxes which were avoidable by removing Abel as a beneficiary.

225. The difficulty for Abel, of course, is that Abel is not party to the conversation that the trustees have had with the solicitor.

226. He has difficulties of proof.

227. As in *Curwen v Vanbreck*, Abel may not be able to draw together the threads sufficiently to prove such fraud on a power. The result in that Victorian case was that the two brothers who were excluded from benefit under that trust were unable to draw together the threads sufficiently. As the Victorian Court of Appeal said:[91]

> *Neither at trial nor on the appeal did the appellants' case rise higher than the suggestion that, because the trustee's decision was made in the context of the beneficiary's request for access to the documents, that must have been a reason for the exercise of the power of exclusion.*

90 At [42].

91 At [49].

11 Appointments of Income and Capital to Cain

228. From the books of account, Abel has deduced that Cain has been favoured with income and capital distributions over many years.

229. The actual identity of the beneficiary favoured is sometimes hidden, as this is regarded as private. Nevertheless, by dint of the fact that Cain has no children or other close relatives with whom he associates, and by further dint of the fact that the accounts show large distributions of income and capital over many years, Abel has been able to deduce that Cain could only be maintaining his luxury lifestyle because of distributions from the fund.

230. As shown above, subject to section 84B of the *Trustee Act (SA)* Abel will be unable to obtain, as trust documents, any notes or resolutions concerning consideration of the merits of distributions to the various objects, until litigation is commenced. Abel would be able to seek disclosure in litigation of some of those documents, probably, but faces a "chicken and egg" problem that he is not properly able to commence litigation to impugn distributions without some solid basis.

231. This is a usual problem faced by many litigants. However, three cases indicate how this kind of problem can be approached.

11.1 Ioppolo v Conti

232. From the Western Australian Court of Appeal, *Ioppolo v Conti*[92] is a case about a superannuation fund. While I have had the argument over the years about whether superannuation is a fixed trust or a discretionary trust, and have heard people defend superannuation trust deeds as fixed trusts, the level of discretion given by most deeds, particularly (and relevantly) in relation to death benefits and reconstitutions of the fund

[92] (2015) 293 FLR 412; [2015] WASCA 45. The case is largely about the superannuation regulations. But it is also useful for the passage in the judgment concerning an exercise of the power to allocate the benefit from the wife's account to the husband's account.

on exit, is so large that no one can deny those elements of discretion. Thus, it is proper to consider superannuation funds in the current context.

233. The simple facts in this case involved a husband and wife who were the trustees and beneficiaries of a self-managed superannuation fund. When the wife died, the husband became the sole trustee. He exercised a power under the deed to transfer benefits in his wife's account to himself.

234. Martin CJ said that the question came down to whether the remaining trustee "failed to address the question of whether it would be inequitable or inappropriate to pay the benefit to himself, as the Nominated Dependant.[93]

235. Again, the matter came down to evidence. The Chief Justice considered that there was no evidence available to support an attack on exercise of the discretion by the remaining trustee. The question came down to whether "the exercise of the trustee's discretion miscarried because he did not give full and proper consideration to the competing interests of the prospect beneficiaries".[94]

236. The court concluded that there was no evidence that there was a sham, and there was no cogent evidence that the trustee's determination miscarried.

237. The important point that sometimes arises in this context is whether the trustee faced a conflict between his duty as trustee and his interest as a beneficiary. That was covered by a clause in the deed which excused such conflicts. Such conflicts cannot be ignored more generally.

11.2 Sinclair v Moss

238. The opposite result occurred in *Sinclair v Moss*.[95]

93 (2015) 293 FLR 412; [2015] WASCA 45, [75].

94 (2015) 293 FLR 412; [2015] WASCA 45, [77].

95 [2006] VSC 130.

239. This case involved a testamentary trust under which there was power to pay income to a widow, but only such income as necessary and sufficient for her support.

240. The trustees failed to consider her other sources of income. This looks like an elementary error in exercising the power. Although it is an unusual power and thus an unusual case, it is nevertheless instructive.

241. The appointments of income to the widow were attacked on the principle that the trustees had considered the wrong question, or (in considering the right question) they did "not really apply their minds to it or perversely shut their eyes to the facts, or that they did not act honestly or in good faith".[96]

242. In that case, there was a requirement to consider the extent to which the widow required support. It was proved by the claimant that the trustees simply determined how much income was available each year, and decided as between the widow and her stepchildren how that income "should be fairly distributed" without taking into account the question of need of the widow.[97]

243. The important decision in this case was that the determinations of the trustees were void. This required the widow to repay the distributions.[98]

244. The like argument also occurred in Western Australian litigation, where it had earlier been determined that the subject family trust had vested many years earlier, but that discretionary distributions had unarguably continued to be made. A claim was brought against beneficiaries who had been given discretionary distributions, requiring them to disgorge the amounts. But a beneficiary successfully ran a defence of change of position,

96 [2006] VSC 130, [17].

97 [2006] VSC 130, [18].

98 [2006] VSC 130, [91].

on the faith of receipt of the wrongful distributions, thus terminating the action against her.[99]

11.3 Owies v JJE Nominees Pty Ltd[100]

245. The Owies had three children, Michael, Deborah and Paul. Each of the mother, father and the three children were objects or beneficiaries of the family trust and in default of appointment of income (or a resolution to accumulate) the trust deed provided that the net income would be held for each of the children in equal shares.

246. This was substantial litigation, and I will cover only one aspect of it here, challenging the distributions of income. In all but one of the years the subject of dispute, income was distributed to the mother, the father and Michael in precise, and repeated, percentages. In the last year, 100% of the income was distributed to the father. It is also true in that last financial year that there was a distribution of capital to Deborah in the form of a residential unit in which Deborah had been living.

247. In terms of the part of the litigation with which we are concerned, Paul and Deborah challenged the distributions of income on the ground that the trustee had failed to give real and genuine consideration to the objects under the trust, with the consequence that the distributions were made in breach of trust. One difficulty that later came to light was that they did not seek any order that money be repaid by those to whom distributions had been made.

248. At trial, the Victorian Supreme Court found that distributions had indeed been made in each of the relevant years, and that finding was not challenged on appeal. The judge found that the trustee had failed to give proper consideration to the position of Paul and Deborah in 2015 and 2016, and to the position of Deborah in 2018. He otherwise rejected

99 *Clay v James* [2001] WASC 101.

100 [2022] VSCA 142

this ground in relation to distributions for the years ended 2015 and later, having accepted a limitation defence in relation to earlier years.

249. The judge correctly found that it was necessary to look at each year in turn, as each year involved separate exercise of the discretion. Ultimately the Court of Appel nevertheless found that the judge was entitled to (and should have) looked at the cumulative effect of the pattern of distributions over the period.[101]

250. The evidence run in the case showed that there had been difficult relationships within the family, and disclosed periods of estrangement. The trustee made no enquiry of either Paul or Deborah as to any need they might have for a distribution of income. The case put by the trustee was that it was informed about their circumstances through the knowledge which directors of the trustee had, which knowledge was said to be imputed to the trustee.[102]

251. The case is instructive in terms of the evidence led. The trust fund might have been worth about $23 million. Thus, it was substantial. The contact between both Paul and Deborah, on the one hand, and their parents and Michael, on the other hand, was set out in great detail in the evidence recited by the trial judge.

252. It would seem that Deborah's circumstances were more necessitous than those of Paul. Deborah suffered developmental trauma, was in need of psychiatric attention, had been diagnosed with Crohn's Disease, and could only manage part-time work. Her taxable income was modest, but her medical expenses were large. Her mother had declined to assist her further with her medical expenses on one occasion, though by 2019 the trustee resolved to make a capital distribution to Deborah of an apartment at South Yarra, owned

101 At [125].

102 At [33].

by the trust, in which Deborah had been living on a modest rent. By that stage, the apartment had become dilapidated.

253. By contrast, the circumstances of John and Eva, the parents, were much more secure. Each year from 2011-2018 inclusive, the trustee distributed the trust's income in the following proportions:

    (a) 40% to John, the father;

    (b) 40% to Michael, the brother; and

    (c) 20% to Eva, the mother.

254. The lower percentage was because Eva had significant other income including a large share portfolio in her own name from which she received income.

255. In 2019, as noted, the father received 100% of the income of the trust estate, despite at that stage having no perceptible needs, and living in care. At that point he had very substantial assets available to him.

256. The above findings were, as it turned out, sufficient to tilt the scales in favour of the beneficiaries challenging the distributions. But the process is worth noting.

257. The Court of Appeal accepted that, even where a discretion was described as "absolute and uncontrolled", the discretionary power is not without bounds.[103]

258. Trustees must "act in good faith, responsibly and reasonably. They must inform themselves, before making a decision, of matters which are relevant to the decision. These matters may not be limited to simple matters of fact but will, on occasion (indeed, quite often) include taking advice from appropriate experts …".[104]

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103 At [81].

104 At [82], citing *Scott v National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty* [1998] 2 All Er 705, 717.

259. Courts nevertheless apply restraint, indeed a "very high degree of restraint", lest the "court be seen to substitute its own decisions for those properly left to the trustee".[105]

260. The fundamental authority of *Karger v Paul*[106] was then cited for the proposition that, in giving content to the obligation to give real and genuine consideration, there must be the exercise of an active discretion. A trustee must consider whether or not to exercise the power. Another way of putting it was that failure to exercise a discretion on real or genuine consideration could be described as acting irresponsibly, capriciously or wantonly.[107]

261. There is a question arising from earlier High Court authority as to whether a discretion expressed to be absolute can only be impugned on the basis of bad faith. The Victorian Court of Appeal considered that this was contrary to authority. The Court of Appeal did not support that higher level of scrutiny.[108]

262. What was critical in *Owies* was the obligation of the trustee to be properly informed, which on the evidence had not occurred. It was nevertheless important to decide the content of that obligation to be properly informed.

263. The size and scale of a trust, and the nature of the relationships that may subsist are important. Also relevant is the purpose of the power of appointment. It has also been said that non-professional trustees without specialist expertise should not be placed under too great a burden.[109] Sometimes, the number of potential objects could be very large. A requirement to undertake a detailed analysis of the identity and needs of each object would be "unworkable", but nevertheless:[110]

105 At [83].

106 [1984] VR 161, 163-164.

107 At [86].

108 At [87]-[88].

109 At [94].

110 At [95].

> *Having considered whether or not to exercise the power and understood the range of objects that might benefit, the trustee is required to give adequate consideration as to how to exercise the power.*

264. In the present case, the primary beneficiaries were the parents and the three children, so considerations contemplated by cases involving larger classes of beneficiaries and objects did not impact. The structure of the trust deed showed that, in default of appointment or accumulation, the children were to take in equal shares. While that did not mean that the trustee was unable to make unequal distributions across the beneficiaries, the exercise of all the powers had to take into account the purpose of the trust and the default position.[111]

265. The Court of Appeal found the following to be significant as well:[112]

(a) The trustee made no enquiries of Paul or Deborah. There was no direct evidence that information imparted to the trustee via the parents found its way into the deliberations of the trustee. There was also a "long history of strained relations" and thus "there was not a free flow of information across the years".

(b) While there was no ability to fill up gaps in the evidence using the *Jones v Dunkel* inference, the "inescapable inference is that the trustee was not informed to an extent that enabled it to make a genuine decision" given the failure to make enquiry.[113]

(c) The income was very substantial each year. Despite variations in the amount of income from time to time, the payout ratio was almost always 40:40:20. There was "no obvious reason why the trustee would favour Michael, John and Eva in this way". That pattern of distributions "could not be explained by need". Indeed, John and Eva simply lent their distributions back to the trust leading to substantial loan accounts. On the other hand, Deborah and, to a lesser extent Paul, "had a

111 At [113].

112 At [114] and following.

113 At [119].

demonstrable need for income". Indeed "Deborah's health and financial situation was parlous".[114]

(d) While Deborah had strong claims on a favourable exercise of discretion, that did not mean a distribution had to be made to her. But "the failure to do so, and the repetition of the same formula in each year … strongly points to a lack of due consideration of her position".[115]

(e) There seems to have been "an elision between the interests of John and Eva and the best interests of the beneficiaries under the trust" in that the parents fell under the power of the guardian and appointor, which had been changed to Michael. This did not relieve them of their obligation to exercise an independent mind. The interests of John and Eva, acting as directors of the trustee, thus did not correspond to the best interests of the beneficiaries.[116]

266. Further considerations listed were:

(a) The history of antipathy between the mother, on the one hand, and each of the two applicant children. Indeed, Paul had asked for a copy of the trust deed and had been resisted.[117]

(b) By 2018, it appeared that the trustee had reached a "policy of distributions with a settled ratio that was inconsistent with a continuing obligation to consider the distribution of income for each accounting period". Here, the Court of Appeal noted that the judge "was correct to view each year separately but … that came at

114 At [120]-[121].

115 At [121].

116 At [122].

117 At [124].

> the cost of understating the overall picture discernible from the pattern of distributions as a whole".[118]

267. Finally, there was the appointment of 100% of the income to John, the father, in the 2019 year, after Eva's death. He was then 96, in full time residential care, and in no need of income. He had loan accounts with the trust for millions of dollars generated from earlier distributions. If no appointment had been made, and no accumulation, the default position under clause 3 of the trust deed would have been equal distribution to the three primary beneficiaries, the children, in equal shares. This distribution of 100% to the father was described in submissions for the applicant beneficiaries as "grotesquely unreasonable".[119] While that is not a term of art, it does emphasise that the decision was "so aberrant that it provides a basis to infer that the exercise of the discretion has miscarried".

268. Although there was no obligation to provide reasons, the fact that the trustee "chose not to explain its reasons" left "the stark pattern of distributions to speak for itself".[120]

269. Unfortunately, there was no application at trial for any money to be repaid. There was debate before the Court of Appeal as to the effect of the proved breaches of trust, in failing to give proper consideration to the exercise of discretion. The Court of Appeal found that such a failure meant that the decisions were only voidable, not void.[121]

270. But "the insurmountable problem for the applicants … [was] that they did not seek at trial the relief that they [now sought] in this Court".[122]

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118 At [125].

119 At [126].

120 At [133].

121 At [143]-[144].

122 At [148].

12 Removal of Trustees and Removal of Appointors

12.1 Whether a fiduciary power

271. Usually, the provision to remove a trustee will be construed as a fiduciary power in Australia. There is also authority that questions that strongly.[123]

272. However, it is truly a matter of construction.[124]

273. In *Mercanti v Mercanti*,[125] Newnes & Murphy JJA say of a clause providing for appointment and removal of a trustee:[126]

> *The object of the power under a provision such as clause 21 is to facilitate the appointment of a new or replacement trustee. A trustee is the archetype of the fiduciary and the office of trustee only exists for the benefit of the beneficiaries. A power of this kind conferred in a trust instrument has generally been construed as having been conferred by the settlor not for the purpose of advancing the personal interests of the appointor or otherwise for the personal enjoyment of the appointor, but rather for the due execution of the trusts for the benefit of the objects of the trust.*

274. There are cases where it has been construed otherwise,[127] but the tendency at least in Australia is to require that the holder of the power, usually called an appointor or some similar designation, acts for the benefit of the beneficiaries as a whole when deciding whether to remove or replace a trustee. He may not act selfishly.

275. Likewise, we have seen cases on the Eastern seaboard where people have attempted to use powers in trust deeds to remove or replace the appointor itself. Those cases have turned, more, on the construction of the power to amend.

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123 *Baba v Sheehan* (2021) 151 ACSR 462, [4] (*obiter dicta*, Brereton JA), Emmett AJA & Simpson AJA not commenting. See also *JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev* [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch) (Birss J), [182], [203], [265]-[272], which doubted the New Zealand High Court's decision on the same deeds, *Kea Trust Co. Ltd v Pugachev* [2015] NZHC 2412 (Heath J).

124 See the lengthier analysis in DW Marks, "Discretionary Trusts – Challenging the Trustee's Discretion" (2021) 25(1) *The Tax Specialist* 39, pages 45-46. And see *Baba v Sheehan* (2021) 151 ASCR 462, [4]. See also the Bermudan decision, *Re FA Trust and FB Trust* (2021) SC (Bda) 2 Civ (Hargun CJ, 6 January 2021).

125 (2016) 50 WAR 495; 340 ALR 290; 117 ACSR 222; [2016] WASCA 206.

126 (2016) 50 WAR 495; 340 ALR 290; 117 ACSR 222; [2016] WASCA 206, [397]. Compare Buss P on this point at [316]-[319].

127 *JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev* [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch).

12.2 Development in scenario – Abel gets control

276. Assume that under the trust deed, and for historical reasons now forgotten, Abel is the appointor upon the death of his parents. This might have been done because of the concern about Cain's ability to deal with this power in the traumatic circumstances of the death of his parents, and given his disability.

277. Assume that the stress of litigation has taken its toll upon the parents, and each dies quickly in succession. This leaves a vacancy in the role of trustee, which Abel decides to fill by appointing as trustee Abel Trading Pty Ltd (***Abel Trading***).

278. Abel is the sole director of Able Trading. Abel Trading's first act as trustee is to cut off the weekly pin money on which Cain has depended for his out of pockets, such as coffee and cigarettes.

279. The next act undertaken by Abel Trading is to appoint the whole of the capital in favour of Abel's children.

280. Cain is quite concerned. He has never been capable of working except in a highly supported environment, has depended on money from the trust all his life, and will find it difficult to obtain social security support for the next five years or so, given his association with the trust, now purportedly vested.

281. Cain will probably attempt to review the appointment of Abel Trading as a trustee. He will also attempt to review the appointment away of the whole capital in favour of Abel's children.

12.3 Change of trustee

282. In *Wareham v Marsella*,[128] again a case about self-managed superannuation, the Victorian Court of Appeal upheld a decision to remove trustees who had decided to pay the whole

[128] (2020) 61 VR 262.

of the death benefit to the husband of a remaining trustee. This was despite the fact that the trust deed gave the trustees a discretion as to which of a deceased beneficiary's dependants should receive a death benefit.

283. That was a case of a blended family, by the looks of it, where such debate can be willing. The remaining trustee had decided to favour her part of the family, and ignore the claim of the second husband of the deceased.

284. The Court considered that the obligation of trustees properly to inform themselves of the needs of the beneficiaries was "more intense" than in other, private discretionary trusts.[129]

285. The trial judge had found that an inference should be drawn that the trustee acted arbitrarily in distributing the fund, with ignorance of (or insolence toward) her duties. She acted in the context of uncertainty, misapprehensions as to the identity of a beneficiary, her duties as trustee, and her position of conflict. She was not therefore in a position to give real or genuine consideration to the interests of the dependants.

286. The conclusion to which the trial judge came was said to be supported by the outcome of the exercise of the discretion.[130]

287. Turning now to the present case, Abel Trading's first act as trustee is to deprive a disabled man of any future support. This will not go down well with the court. Further, in *Wareham v Marsella*, above, the court was moved to remove the trustee. The fact that there had been a resolution to wind up the trust was no impediment to making remedial orders,[131] and the distributions were set aside in that case.

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129 (2020) 61 VR 262, [60].

130 (2020) 61 VR 262, [62].

131 (2020) 61 VR 262, [106].

12.4 Challenge to appointment

288. See heading 11, concerning appointments of income and capital to Cain, for the principles that apply.

289. I turn to some other observations about trust litigation.

13 Some Other Formalities -

13.1 Required statement as to representative capacity

290. If a person is suing or being sued in a "representative capacity", the plaintiff or applicant must state the representative capacity on the originating process: rule 18 of the *UCPR* (Qd). There are similar rules interstate and for the Federal Court.[132]

291. Jackson J recently explained the rationale and advantages for disclosure of the representative capacity: *LM Investment Management Limited (in liq) v EY*.[133]

292. A trust has no legal personality. It cannot be made a party to a proceeding. The appropriate party to press a claim on behalf of beneficiaries, or when a claim is made against beneficiaries and assets of a trust, is the trustee. Thus:

> *Although the rules of court do not make the specific provision in that regard that is made by the civil procedure rules in other jurisdictions, a proceeding by a trustee in that capacity in this jurisdiction is ordinarily expressly endorsed on that basis, as is a proceeding against a trustee in that capacity.*

293. Jackson J gives three reasons why that is done under current statutory provisions:

    (a) there is express statutory authorisation for a trustee to sue or be sued by himself in another capacity: section 59 of the *Trusts Act 1973* (Qd);

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132 I could not find a similar rule for New South Wales. In the Federal Court, refer Rule 8.01(2). For the various other Supreme Courts see as follows - ACT Rule 50.4, Northern Territory Rule 5.06, South Australia Rule 38 of the *Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006*, Tasmania Rule 111, Victoria Rule 5.06 of the *Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015*, Western Australia O.6 r.5, and see Schedule 2 Form 5. As this paper is about practice in Queensland, and the interstate practice may vary, I will not analyse practice interstate. As a quick cross-reference, refer Cairns *Australian Civil Procedure* (12th Edition) paragraph 3.50 footnote 24, and see the more detailed treatment by Zuckerman and others in *Zuckerman on Australian Civil Procedure* from paragraph 4.56. See also Rule 8.2 of the *Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK)*.

133 [2019] QSC 246, [22]

(b) a proceeding started and continued by or against a person as representing all of the persons who have the same interest and could have been parties to the proceeding will result in an order that binds the persons who had the same interests as the representative party and who could have been parties to the proceeding, unless otherwise ordered: section 18 of the *Civil Proceedings Act 2011* (Qd);

(c) Rule 18 of the *UCPR (Qd).*

294. Turning to the last of those, Jackson J points out that the rule has been "construed as applying to a proceeding brought by or against a trustee in that capacity", that this is a beneficial construction, and says that that construction should be followed.

295. The case to which Jackson J points in that last passage is *Moore v Devanjul Pty Ltd*.[134] McMeekin J simply reaches that conclusion at [3] without further explanation.

296. Indeed, the true application of Rule 18, more generally, has been problematic. Outside the context of trusts, it has been held that the agent for an undisclosed principal is not obliged by Rule 18 to give up its ordinary right to sue or be sued in its own name.[135]

297. Similarly, the actual consequences of failure to comply are elusive. Under the former *Rules of the Supreme Court of Queensland 1901*, Order 6 Rule 6, it had been held that failure to make the required endorsement (rather than simply indicating representative capacity in the title of the proceeding) gave rise to a defect capable of cure by amendment.[136]

298. Likewise, an error in the description of capacity was capable of amendment.[137]

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134 [2012] QSC 66

135 *IVI Pty Ltd v Baycrown Pty Ltd* [2007] 1 Qd R 428, [26] *et seq*., upholding [2005] QSC 330

136 *Daly v Public Curator* [1949] QWN 1, page 3

137 *Turley v Kassulke* [1970] QWN 24

299. In the latter case, the plaintiff's endorsement on the claim referred to her as the administratrix of her late husband's estate, which was in error as she had been granted probate as executrix of his Will prior to issue of the writ.

300. I cannot see why current powers of amendment would not also extend to these issues as they arise under Rule 18.

301. However, merely stating the capacity of a person does not cure other defects, such as failure to join a necessary party.

302. This is where matters can become difficult, as in the litigation concerning the pleadings in *Park v Lanray Industries Pty Ltd*.[138]

303. In that case - not concerning a trust but rather the company which operated the "Big Pineapple" and its liquidators - the pleadings did not sufficiently distinguish claims properly brought by a liquidator, and claims of the insolvent company.

304. A real problem for the moving party in that litigation was that time had run.

305. In the end, the Courts treated the case as akin to misnomer, ordering that the insolvent company be added as an additional plaintiff (and that the moving parties in the litigation have leave to amend the claim and amended statement of claim to give effect to reasons given by the Court of Appeal).

306. It would have been insufficient to have left the liquidators as the sole plaintiffs, despite the allegation in the body of the statement of claim that they were entitled to sue on behalf of the insolvent company.[139] That is consistent with the statement of Holmes JA at [3]:

> *Rule 18 … requires that a plaintiff suing in a representative capacity state that representative capacity on the originating process. The respondents are named as plaintiffs in the title of the claim, without elaboration as to capacity. However, the claim seeks, as well as judgment under s 588FF, orders that the payments and transactions are "void against the liquidators". The amended statement of claim exhibits some confusion. In its first paragraph, it is pleaded that the respondents are "entitled to be appointed … liquidators of the Company" (not that they <u>are</u> the liquidators of the company) and that they are … "entitled to commence these*

138 [2010] QSC 82; orders varied by [2010] QCA 257

139 [2010] QCA 257, [7]

> *proceedings on behalf of the Company …" … Clearly, this proceeding was not brought in the company's name. However, a later paragraph of the amended statement of claim pleads the respondents' appointment as the company's liquidators.*

307. In short, the only way to regularise was actually to state the name of the necessary party in the title to the proceedings, since it was seeking the order under section 588FF.

308. This was despite section 477(2)(a) of the *Corporations Act* which permits a liquidator to bring a legal proceeding in the name of and on behalf of the company.

13.2 Conclusions about rule 18

309. Common sense and universal practice suggest complying with Rule 18 where suing as trustee, or when suing an entity known to be a trustee.

310. If nothing else, the statement of the representative capacity (in the enlarged sense adopted by McMeekin J in *Moore v Devanjul Pty Ltd*, above), together with pleading the necessary facts to establish that representative capacity, may bring clarity of thinking.

311. It would be preferable for the parties to be identified correctly, and all necessary persons made parties, rather than face the difficulties seen in *Park v Lanray Industries Pty Ltd*, above.

14 Tax, Rectification and Disclaimer

312. A positive result in trust litigation leaves the litigants, on both sides, with imponderable tax issue.

14.1 Improper distributions

313. A fraud on a power appears to result in a distribution being void.[140]

314. But this point was left undecided by the Privy Council recently in *Grandview Private Trust Co Ltd v Wen-Young Wong*.[141]

315. There is detailed consideration in the UK Supreme Court decision *Pitt v Holt*, but again no conclusion. The Court notes earlier authority for the proposition that a fraudulent appointment was void rather than voidable.[142]

316. Another case we have considered determined to <u>set aside</u> the distributions, and facilitated a new trustee re-exercising the discretion to distribute.[143] Presumably, the earlier distribution stood, pending judicial order.

317. It had been thought, historically, that a merely excessive exercise of a power would be upheld to the extent possible under the power, but would be void beyond that.[144]

318. All this leads to difficulties in assigning a tax character to a payment <u>actually</u> made or credited.

319. There is little authority in Australia on the point.

320. The Tribunal case of *U201*[145] considers an unusual situation, where distributions were made to an accountant's trusts, unconnected with the family of the client. Although the

140 *Sinclair v Moss* [2006] VSC 130, [84].

141 [2022] UKPC 47, [122].

142 *Pitt v Holt* [2013] 2 AC 108, [62].

143 *Wareham v Marsella* (2020) 61 VR 262, [105].

144 MacLean, *Trusts and Powers* (1989), p 126.

145 87 ATC 1122.

discretions exercised were more than simply discretions about appointment of income, and although the case is thus not directly in point, the suggestion there was that the distributions were voidable. There was an argument that the recipient held on a constructive trust which had to be tested in an ordinary court of equitable jurisdiction.

321. This suggests that litigation about these issues involves sequencing, in the State courts for relief about who was actually entitled (and the consequences, such as a declaration that someone held on a constructive trust); and in the limited Federal jurisdictions for the review or appeal, once the State courts have made their determinations.

322. In a practical sense, a time-limited power of appointment of income, modelled on those in *Ramsden v Commissioner of Taxation*,[146] would mean that a failure effectively to appoint income by the end of 30 June in a year would result in the default gift. Many deeds in Australia have that version of power.

323. In light of *Owies*, above, it must now be considered that an attack on exercise of a power appointment, based on a failure to give real and genuine consideration to the objects under the trust, would result only in a voidable disposition of property.

324. More recently, the Privy Council noted the debate, as to whether a purported appointment in fraud on a power was void or merely voidable, but the parties had agreed it was void.[147]

325. Given the policy drivers enunciated in *FCT v Carter*,[148] it must be doubted that the avoidance of a distribution after year end would change imposition of tax on the person to whom the distribution was made. Redistribution to some other beneficiary, as income, does not assure absence of further tax.

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146 2004 ATC 4659.

147 *Grand View Private Trust Co Ltd v Wen-Young Wong* [2022] UKPC 47, [122], noting *Pitt v Holt* [2013] 2 AC 108, [62].

148 (2022) 96 ALJR 325.

14.2 Retroactive solutions? Rectification and disclaimer

326. It is possible to rectify a unilateral document, such as resolution of directors.[149]

327. However, it is not possible simply to rectify documents at will. There must be good reason, which lies in some mistake, in representing in written form what was intended. A mere mistake as to the legal effect is not enough.

328. Since the court is rectifying a document to accord with the actual agreement (or the actual resolution), the result can be seen to have an element of retroactivity.

329. Again, there is no point prosecuting a review or appeal against tax, until the rectification has been ordered.[150]

330. Disclaimer, after year end, has been shown to be ineffective for income tax purposes: *Commissioner of Taxation v Carter*.[151,152]

331. Suffice to say that the old theory was that the effect of disclaimer was retroactive. *Carter* now shows that this retroactivity was not universal.

14.3 Conclusion

332. Though these scenarios are a work of fiction, the scenarios are inspired by real cases. Real families have this level of dysfunction.

333. The tax drivers are often the last thing considered, in ridding a trust of an inconvenient beneficiary, or in reinstating monies improperly lost or paid.

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149 *Trani v Trani* [2018] VSC 274, [151].

150 I have set out some illustrative cases at greater length in my article, "Discretionary Trusts – Challenging the Trustee's Discretion" (2021), above, pages 47-48.

151 (2022) 96 ALJR 325; 399 ALR 521; 114 ATR 740; 2022 ATC ¶20-822; [2022] HCA 10

152 The difficulty resolved there was the apparent conflict between the New South Wales Court of Appeal, on the one hand, and the Full Federal Court, on the other hand, as to the retroactivity of disclaimer, at least for taxing statutes.
The New South Wales Court of Appeal decision was *Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Smeaton Grange Holdings Pty Ltd* (2017) 106 ATR 151. The Full Federal Court case was *Carter v Commissioner of Taxation* 2020 ATC ¶20-760, and that case was supported by a decision of Spender J in *Ramsden v Commissioner of Taxation* 2004 ATC 4659, [51], [66], [67].

334. But the tax drivers are incredibly difficult, and unresolved by case law.

335. You should resolve the tax dispute by orders of the ordinary civil courts, before approaching the AAT or Federal Court for your tax dispute. Indeed, there is a school of thought that you are stuck with the facts as at the time of the objection and determination. This means that you should seek any necessary orders from the State courts before filing the objection, or at least before the objection is finalised.[153]

David W. Marks KC

26 May 2023

[153] *Ramsden*, above, at [51], [66], [67].